This paper focuses on the requirements and features of a successful monetary union on the basis of the optimum currency area theory, the "logical roadmap" for integration as proposed by Balassa as well as the economic and institutional framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The analysis suggests that monetary union is contingent upon high economic integration and strong political commitment. However, political union is not an ex-ante requirement. Outside factors such as systemic shocks and globalization seem to speed up the pooling of sovereignty in the economic domain. A firm commitment to stability-oriented monetary and fiscal policies is a precondition for gaining credibility and trust within and outside a monetary union. Last, but not least, convergence criteria, fiscal rules and strong institutions are necessary to help ensure and monitor the participants' compliance. However, the European experience is not a blueprint for regional integration that can be directly and entirely applied to other regions.
Introduction
Ever since the European Union (EU) decided to implement a monetary union, interest in regional currency arrangements and their theoretical foundation has surged. Up to this day, the basic theoretical foundation for this kind of analysis is the optimum currency area (OCA) literature. In the late 1990s, OCA theory was complemented by the finding that the criteria for successful monetary integration need not necessarily be fulfilled ex ante but that they can be fulfilled ex post owing to the workings of a monetary union. OCA criteria can thus be seen as endogenous by nature. This proposition suggests there are different possible paths to a monetary union. This paper will briefly highlight some aspects of the OCA literature, review the sequencing of economic integration, investigate the steps taken in Europe and draw some conclusion for the evolution and creation of currency arrangements in other regions of the world.
OCAs and the role of institutions

OCAs
The classical theory of OCAs was developed by Mundell, McKinnon and Kenen as early as the 1960s. It defines an optimum currency area as a geographical region in which it is advantageous for member countries to use absolutely fixed exchange rates or have a common currency. The key factors determining whether countries belong to an OCA include the degree of economic diversification, openness, labor and capital mobility as well as wage and price flexibility. The idea behind the OCA theory is well known. If the participating countries do not meet OCA criteria, real adjustment in a fixed exchange rate regime takes a long time and can be very costly in the event a shock. In this case, a flexible exchange rate facilitates faster adaptation and minimizes costs.
More recent works (e.g. Frankel, 1999 ) discuss another advantage of flexible exchange rates based on the "impossible trinity", i.e. the impossibility of having a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility and monetary independence at the same time. In the presence of high capital mobility, flexible exchange rates allow policymakers to conduct an independent monetary policy 8 for domestic purposes 1 . If, however, national policymakers cannot make good use of the independence of monetary policy, it may be better to give it up and import stability from other countries. Indeed, monetary independence can be a curse rather than a blessing (Tavlas, 2003) .
Furthermore, other factors (e.g. central bank independence, administrative capacity, depth and liquidity of foreign exchange markets) can influence the tradeoff between monetary independence and exchange rate stability.
The question whether OCA criteria are exogenous or endogenous has also been debated.
Frankel and Rose (1998) argue that several criteria, such as the synchronization of business cycles or trade relationships, are endogenous. These criteria can be self-validating insofar as countries joining a currency union will in fact move closer together by increasing trade among them and business cycle correlations. Indeed, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) has for a long time argued that Austria's hard currency peg to the Deutsche mark (which had been pursued for two decades prior to the start of EMU) was a showcase of a currency peg that created the conditions for its own credibility and sustainability over time: when Austria opted for an exchange rate peg in 1974, the two countries did not yet meet OCA requirements. The Austrian schilling's appreciation relative to the Deutsche mark between 1979 and 1981 served as a signal, thus increasing the credibility of the hard currency regime. This "hard-currency-option" triggered off adjustment processes which ultimately made Austria part of an OCA with Germany (Hochreiter and Winckler, 1995) . In our own terminology we coined the term "structural whip"
for this mechanism, arguing that a fixed exchange rate policy creates strong incentives for structural reforms which make the exchange rate peg beneficial and sustainable. For a recently published summary of the reasoning behind the hard currency policy, see Gnan et al (2005) .
There are several ways how a country's membership in a monetary union may contribute to the ex-post fulfillment of OCA criteria:
(1) it can stimulate trade, which (2) can affect a member's trade and production patterns by making it less vulnerable to industryspecific shocks (symmetry of shocks and synchronization of outputs);
(3) increased competition can contribute to making product and labor markets more flexible, and 9 (4) membership in a monetary union will stimulate the integration of capital markets, which may increase the abilities for absorbance and risk sharing in the event of a shock.
European experiences
Monetary arrangements are closely connected to the degree of economic and political regional integration. According to Balassa's famous "logical roadmap" for integration (Balassa, 1962) , countries first create a free trade area. In a next step, they introduce a common external tariff, thus de facto creating a customs union. In a third step, they further improve efficiencies by creating an internal market. And finally, to make full use of the benefits of the internal market, the member countries introduce a common currency to achieve a further deepening of the integration process. This, in turn, generates incentives for further political integration. While
Balassa's roadmap is plausible and, to a certain extent, reflects the European experience, it is certainly impossible to derive straightforward "laws" governing regional integration in the global political economy.
In Europe, political cooperation and exchange rate stability have been regarded as key elements in preventing beggar-thy-neighbor policies through competitive devaluations, and thus as preconditions for sustainable trade integration. This is why the EU Member States furthered political cooperation, institution building, regional integration and exchange rate stability before introducing capital mobility and monetary union. It can also be argued that the objective of the European regional integration process encompassed more than just creating a common market.
The political will was underpinned by an ambitious vision which included, from the very start, the establishment of a monetary union and eventually of a kind of "United States of Europe" in order to achieve a permanent reconciliation of the continent after centuries of war.
The move towards monetary union in Europe, which was driven by political as well as economic considerations, involved several steps. The final moves before the adoption of the euro in 1999 were made in a relatively short period of time: the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, the exchange rate mechanism ERM I was put in place in 1979, capital flows were fully liberalized by 1990, the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1991 and the establishment of the internal market was realized by 1992.
The debate on macroeconomic policymaking in general, and on the creation of a monetary union in particular, was stimulated by the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System and, between 1979 and 1987, by the frequent and very significant realignments in the newly created ERM I. In
June 1988, an important decision was taken with regard to establishing the single market: to remove all exchange controls impeding the movement of capital by the mid-1990s. This decision made it possible for capital to move across borders without restrictions and to react to divergent economic performances. As a result, central banks lost much of their ability to control exchange rates, which could possibly have amplified exchange rate volatility and hence posed a serious threat to the functioning of the internal market. In this crucial situation, the Delors Report (which was adopted by the European Council in June 1989) forged a common understanding of macroeconomic policymaking and the creation of a monetary union. This process resulted in the Maastricht Treaty of December 1991 -a milestone on the road toward European integration.
In the political arena, the agreement to establish EMU was attributable to two reasons: (1) the firm commitment of several EU member states to the ongoing process of European integration, mainly driven by France and Germany (Maes, 2002), and (2) the shared vision of a European economic power that has overcome "Eurosclerosis" and is able to strengthen its position in the global economy.
There were, however, also other reasons for the establishment of EMU: the process of integration had acquired a life and a history of its own over some 50 years, individual governments were bound by the commitments made by their predecessors and none of the member states wished to be left behind as the EU embarked on one of the most consequential institutional innovations in its history. Another factor was the realization that, even though the continued commitment to EMU and the implementation of policies to achieve the EMU criteria were at times costly, these efforts would serve national interests in the end. This is what distinguishes the European experience from other regional integration processes observed today.
No matter whether the OCA criteria were fulfilled in a strict sense from the start of EMUthe stakeholders involved expected the participating countries to achieve a sufficient degree of convergence in the process. Especially in the second half of the 1990s, the prospect of EMU considerably accelerated the convergence process. Even though the difference in real convergence was still considerable, nominal convergence improved notably supported by a strong institutional framework geared to monetary and fiscal stability, as well as the four freedoms within the single market.
Notwithstanding the existence of several masterplans with predefined deadlines (e.g. for the single market or EMU), the process of European integration can probably be better described as "muddling through" or -to use a more positive metaphor -an evolutionary process which included serious and lingering differences up until the final outcome. Yet, it follows from (neo-) functionalist theory that each integration step makes the next one more likely. Hence, European integration can be described as a dynamic process that has never been predetermined and in which unplanned moves become possible when the occasion arises. It appears that, contrary to opportunities, time has not always been of essence.
Requirements and long-run sustainability
The Maastricht Treaty specifies the conditions EU Member States have to fulfill in order to be eligible for joining EMU. These requirements include the well-known macroeconomic convergence criteria and legal requirements such as central bank independence. These criteria were a driving force for nominal convergence and helped ensure and monitor compliance, as governments showed their willingness to follow stability-oriented policies without imposing costs on other members.
The experience with the ERM I showed that the road toward a common currency is paved with difficulties. ERM I made painfully clear that the internal adaptability of some participating economies was insufficient and therefore not credible for a smooth working of the peg. The periodic crises and the recurring need for realignments within the ERM demonstrated that a currency union is only sustainable if (1) the economic policies of its member countries are oriented toward promoting competitiveness and growth and (2) if they are coordinated at least to the extent that they are not contradictory, thus leading to economic convergence rather than divergence in the long run.
As McCallum already noted in 1995, a common currency requires a firmer and lasting commitment than other forms of hard pegs given that policy consistency and credibility have to increase over time (McCallum, 1995) .
The role of institutions
The idea that economic institutions affect a society's functioning and prosperity is not new at all. As a matter of fact, one of the first scholars to promote it was nobody else than Adam In this context, it is important to point out that the incentive structure of national macroeconomic policymaking and structural reforms in EMU are somewhat different from the pre-EMU period. Being a member of the EU, but not yet part of the euro area, the probably greater differentiation by financial markets, as the exchange rate risk is still real, and the sustainable fulfillment of the convergence criteria as a precondition for joining EMU, have proven to be effective instruments to promote economic reforms, sound macroeconomic policy making and thus nominal and real economic convergence. These rather direct incentive mechanisms outside EMU transform once a country has joined the euro area. Hence, EMU members need to comply with more stringent rules, most notably the Stability and Growth Pact, which becomes an even more powerful inmstrument in EMU. In addition, a rather insidious economic process is inherent in every monetary union, as a result of which badly designed policies lead to a loss of competitiveness. This is a development which is costly to reverse.
Actually, such an economic divergence within EMU would run counter to the idea that the OCA process is endogenous.
Hence, the participating member states and policymakers in EMU have to have an even higher level of awareness, responsibility and self-discipline when it comes to structural and macroeconomic policymaking. In this respect, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, the Employment Guidelines, and the Lisbon National Reform Programs, along with the associated surveillance and peer pressure mechanisms, are essential institutional instruments.
Fiscal rules
Fiscal rules are another very important factor for the long-run sustainability of a monetary union (Christl, 2003; Hochreiter et al, 2002) . Since fiscal policies remain the responsibility of national governments, fiscal rules are based on political economy considerations and are intended to restrict the deficit bias of national governments. Public expenditure is often financed by issuing debt owing to inter-temporal redistribution considerations, as this type of financing shifts fiscal burdens from the present to the future.
Fiscal rules are also important because membership in a monetary union can give rise to moral hazard and free-rider problems (Bruni, 2004) . Moral hazard occurs when a member country expects to be bailed out by the others when it is faced with unsustainable debt levels.
Free-riding, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which the adverse impact of fiscal laxity is not entirely borne by those national authorities which embark on fiscal expansion, but driving up the union-wide interest rate. In addition, free-riding might induce others to relax their fiscal discipline, too, and weaken EU fiscal rules in general.
In addition to making monetary policymaking more complicate owing to demand effects on prices, excessive deficits also entail significant medium-and long-run costs (e.g. higher real interest rates and tax burdens). Moreover, if the monetary authorities in a currency union are not sufficiently independent, political pressure may be exerted upon the central bank to monetize government debt. The resulting loss in central bank credibility can drive up inflation expectations and steady-state inflation.
It appears that financial market agents apply a non-linear risk function to government debt and/or simply do not believe that the no-bail-out clause is irrevocable (Treaty establishing the European Community, Art. 103). Hence, interest rate spreads are only a minor punishment for excessive deficits, at least in the context of the current debt dynamics in the euro area. However, this is no reason for complacency, as a sudden change in the financial market's assessment may cause abrupt and strong corrections in the financial markets at some point in time. Once fiscal imbalances have built up, higher interest rates can quickly trigger a vicious circle of growing debt and increasing interest rates.
Finally, fiscal rules are important because they provide some type of agreed benchmark.
Policymakers have to justify their fiscal stance in relation to the benchmark in international bodies (e.g. the Eurogroup and the ECOFIN in the EU), national bodies (e.g. parliaments) and the public at large.
For all these reasons, fiscal rules are a necessary feature in a credible, sustainable and successful monetary union. Watering down the Stability and Growth Pact would not at all be helpful in this respect.
Benefits and costs
Eliminating transaction costs and exchange rate risks increases economic growth by reducing real interest rates and stimulating the international division of labor and capital, which But EMU has also incurred indirect costs, the most important of which are related to a serious loss of price competitiveness of the export industries in some countries (especially in Italy and Spain). Obviously, fiscal laxity has also increased, mainly in some of the larger countries.
Moreover, the political commitment to Europe and to the common currency, which is an important condition for the long-run sustainability of the monetary union, has suffered in recent years.
There is some evidence that, for small countries, the benefits of EMU outweigh its costs by a relatively large margin, mainly because losing the exchange-rate instrument is not connected to significant costs. Small countries (such as Belgium or Austria) are generally more open and more exposed to the effects of globalization and international competition. This is why they tended to be more diligent in undertaking ambitious structural reforms. By contrast, larger countries are often more concerned about the domestic effects of reforms and are thus more reluctant to proceed with their implementation. However, also these countries have eventually made the experience that relying on the domestic economy alone is a short-sighted approach. Structural rigidities combined with the lack of autonomous monetary policy makes adjustment to asymmetric shocks a painful and tedious process.
Furthermore, the net benefits of monetary union are not the same for all members. In the long run, especially EMU members at the periphery, which do not completely fulfill the OCA criteria, cannot be expected to benefit from EMU to the same extent as the states of the U.S.
(Kouparitsas, 1999).
Closer monetary integration in other regions?
Central and Eastern European countries
The first of the new EU Member States from Central and Eastern European countries reforms. Given the considerable differences in nominal and real convergence with the euro area in some of the new Member States, however, there is still some way to go before they can join the euro area. In order to comply with EMU requirements, they need to undertake further reforms and implement sound fiscal policies.
Asia, Latin America and the Middle East
According to the Balassa sequencing, stronger regional integration has two consequences:
First, when a free trade area becomes a single market, it is important to maintain intra-regional exchange rate stability in order to reap the full benefits from such a move. Second, a converging stability orientation of monetary policies in the countries involved promotes exchange rate stability.
The conditions for establishing EMU in Europe were in several respects different from the current situation in Asia and Latin America
In Asia and in Latin America it is difficult to define homogenous regions, as they tend to be pluralistic and overlapping. In Asia and Latin America, the political and economic regimes as well as the levels of nominal and real convergence are more heterogeneous than in Europe. Therefore, the benefits of monetary integration would be lower and the associated costs and risks would be higher on both continents.
In 
Stability-oriented macro-policies as an alternative?
For the reasons mentioned earlier, establishing a currency union in the near future is neither desirable nor realistic for many countries or regions of the world. Still, relatively stable exchange rates in line with economic fundamentals, which stimulate world trade and the international division of labor, support a prosperous development of the world economy. Stability-oriented monetary and fiscal policies are necessary preconditions in this context.
Traditional monetary policy frameworks designed to achieve low inflation and sustainable growth rested upon intermediate variables such as monetary aggregates to anchor expectations.
This concept is often not suitable for emerging market economies (EMEs) mainly because of instable money demand functions. Experience in some EMEs has shown that an explicit inflation target can provide a credible anchor for inflation expectations. Thus, inflation targeting 2 may be a successful strategy for larger EMEs to foster the desired macroeconomic stability, while at the same time remaining flexible enough to cope with external shocks. Price stability and sound fiscal policy are clearly a precondition for further monetary integration in the future.
The inflation-targeting experience of Brazil and Chile shows that it is indeed possible for a country to make progress in reducing inflation and gain credibility. Another benefit, as pointed out by Bernanke et al. (1999) , is that an inflation-targeting framework is not based on an automatic Friedman-type rule but rests on constrained discretion: Chile and Brazil, for example, proceeded gradually and flexibly in implementing inflation targeting, which helped reduce inflation without incurring substantial output costs. Therefore, a case can be made for adopting an inflation targeting policy framework, especially in larger EMEs, since it forces policymakers to step up reform, enhance transparency and improve the fiscal stance, while promoting convergence to (by international standards) low levels of inflation.
Conclusions
The successful completion of EMU and the introduction of the euro have substantially increased the general interest in regional integration and especially in regional monetary arrangements. The experience with monetary integration in Europe so far suggests that
• monetary union is contingent upon a high level of economic integration and a firm political commitment;
• political union is not at all an ex-ante requirement;
• outside factors, such as systemic shocks and globalization, seem to speed up the pooling of sovereignty in the economic domain;
• a clear stability orientation in the monetary and fiscal field is a precondition for gaining credibility and trust within and outside a monetary union; emerging markets. Monetary policy is constrained in a system with an exchange rate rule, so that it cannot react to domestic or external shocks. In developing countries/EMEs the exchange rate itself can be a source of instability e.g. owing to a real appreciation of the exchange rate (Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect).
• convergence criteria, fiscal rules and strong institutions are necessary to ensure and monitor compliance.
However, the EU experience is not a blueprint for regional integration that can be directly and entirely applied to other regions. Unreflective comparison will most likely lead us into the dangerous trap of Eurocentrism.
Although a number of studies argue that OCA criteria are at least to a certain extent endogenous, I strongly believe that the Balassa sequencing provides us with a meaningful pattern of how to achieve a higher level of regional integration. Successfully anchoring inflation The question underlying differences in voting patterns among voters is: Who will benefit and who will lose from membership in a monetary union? Thus, distributional issues immediately take centre stage. The OCA approach provides a number of testable hypotheses. Voters in the tradable sector or in other sectors exposed to the international economy could be expected to be more in favour of the euro than voters in the non-tradable sector or other sectors sheltered from international influences. Voters with no or little exposure to the international economy, who depend primarily on domestic economic and political developments, are likely to prefer national policy autonomy. Such independence gives them better insurance against domestic and international disturbances, both symmetric and asymmetric, than an irrevocably fixed rate. Voters who depend on the public sector (the welfare state) could be expected to favour the krona, as euro membership is viewed as a threat to a large public sector.
High income earners and well educated voters would be expected to vote yes to the euro as they have insurance through the private sector. Low income voters would be expected to vote no as their insurance and protection against shocks comes primarily from the public sector. Women tend to prefer public sector solutions; hence, more women than men could be expected to vote against the euro.
The outcome of the Swedish referendum confirms these predictions of the OCA approach.
However, political attitudes and ideology influenced voters as well. The outcomes of the various referenda on membership in the European Union in other European countries are also consistent with these predictions. Consequently, we should expect similar patterns to hold for the rest of the world. Thus, domestic political conditions are likely to be important determinants of membership in any future monetary union.
The endogeneity of monetary unions.
Christl gives considerable credence to the idea that monetary union performance is endogenous. In other words, the longer you are a member of a club, the better you will fit into it.
There is considerable evidence that such mechanisms are at work. However, today we also notice a number of tendencies that challenge this interpretation in the euro area.
First of all, "Maastricht fatigue" on the budgetary side is clearly evident in several countries. Fiscal discipline has been difficult to maintain once countries have entered the euro area. This fatigue contributed to the modifications of the initial Stability and Growth Pact.
We also see real interest rate differentials arising across the euro area. There is no consensus regarding the role of these developments. Some economists argue that they simply reflect the workings of a monetary union, and thus should not be viewed as a source of tension.
Others argue that they demonstrate that a common nominal interest rate across the euro area will foster different growth rates across the unions and thus strengthen imbalances.
The success of the common currency depends on the flexibility of the real economy of the euro area. For this reason economic reforms are important to make the euro area move towards an optimal monetary area. However, since the downturn of economic activity in Europe following 25 the stock market bust in 2000-2001, political resistance towards economic reforms has been strong. Interest groups across EU have mobilized the public and politicians against productivityenhancing reforms, thus preventing EU from reaping the full advantages of a common currency.
There is presently a risk that the euro is turning into a scapegoat for the economic problems facing Europe. In this blame-game, some politicians may be tempted to question euromembership instead of tackling the domestic roots of slow growth and high unemployment. This type of behaviour has a long tradition in history. It is not the first time that international cooperation has been exploited for domestic purposes by populist forces.
Christl shows that Austria created the necessary domestic fiscal and monetary discipline prior to entry into the euro-area by using the "structural whip". This whip worked successfully in
Austria before euro-membership. However, the challenge is to maintain a well-functioning whip now that Austria is inside the monetary union. This holds not only for Austria, but for all members of the euro area.
Fiscal rules and fiscal independence.
Christl argues forcefully for the use of fiscal rules. However, experience has proved that such rules are difficult to enforce, since policy-makers are innovative and tend to develop techniques to circumvent any straitjacket constructed to rein them in.
Much suggests that fiscal rules should be complemented by other techniques to foster fiscal performance. Fiscal governance may be improved through reforms of the institutions involved in the framing of fiscal measures. Let me give some examples. Within the EU, statistical offices may be more independent from the executive power. In a similar way, independent forecasting authorities, such as exist in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, can be set up in countries where the ministry of finance has systematically biased its forecasts concerning future growth and thus ex post created a budget deficit bias. 2 Independent budgetary offices may also be part of an institutional reform of fiscal policy-making.
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The idea of independent fiscal bodies that are not under the immediate control of the ministry of finance and the government is an attractive one, regardless of the specific exchange rate arrangement adopted. It is an idea worth exporting from Europe to the rest of the world.
Muddling through or policy-learning.
Christl views Europe and the euro area as involved in a process of muddling through. I would like to suggest a more positive interpretation. The euro area is going through a learning process. As Christl stresses, European monetary unification is not following a master plan.
Instead Europe is adjusting to new disturbances and new challenges as they emerge while at the same time learning about the new economic and political landscape.
The euro is a large full-scale experiment -unique in monetary and economic history. As long as there is a learning process going on, new lessons will be learnt and thus improvements can be made. This flexibility is important to ensure the sustainability of the monetary unification process. 3 This message should be conveyed to the rest of the world.
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Co-organized by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Bank of Greece Europe will converge slowly toward more normal rates during an adjustment interval, a feature of which has the US absorbing a disproportionate share of world savings. In real terms, while the dollar and other floating currencies will eventually have to depreciate relative to pegged currencies, most of the adjustment in the US trade account will result from a response of US absorption to increases in real interest rates.
Nouriel Roubini takes issue with the DFG thesis. In particular, he argues that the new Bretton Woods system is fundamentally different from the original Bretton Woods regime.
The new system is unstable and fragile and will unravel in the next few years and not over a period of a decade or longer as posited by DFG. Roubini points out that the structure of the new regime has undergone changes in the past few years that contribute to its fragility.
Whereas in the earlier years of the new regime US dollar reserves were primarily accumulated by Asian economies running current account surpluses, in the past few years those surpluses have been shrinking partly because of the effects of oil price increases. In the past year or so, the large US current account deficits have been partly sustained by pegged exchange rates and reserve accumulations by oil exporting countries, a situation which Roubini believes is not sustainable. Consequently, the new Bretton Woods system could unravel in the next few years with the dollar falling sharply, the consequences of which would be a disorderly rebalancing of the global economy
